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TheLiberalization Episode:
Evaluation and Lessons
Inlight of the analysis in chapters 6 through 10, what can we conclude
about the success of this liberalization episode, and what lessons can we draw
from it regarding the prerequisites of a successful liberalization package?
WAS THE LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
SUCCESSFUL?
In deciding whether the liberalization episode was successful, we need to
distinguish sharply between the way it was regarded by public opinion, in-
cluding elite opinion, and an objective appraisal of the results in relation to
the aims of the liberalization effort. These two different ways of judging the
outcome are important to distinguish because the undertaking was a complex
of policies. In consequence, it was difficult to assess and its objectives were
not clearly understood. We now examine (1) the objectives of the package,
(2) how far they were achieved in practice, and (3) what the general
assessments are.
The Objectives.
The June 1966 policy reforms appear to have had the following objectives,
in the main:
1. the replacement of the inefficient de facto devaluation by a de jure
devaluation; and
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2. the reduction, through the net additional devaluation plus import
liberalization, of the adverse impact of the OR-regime on export performance.
Of these two objectives, the emphasis in the official pronouncements
seems to have been on the former. The theme that the export subsidization
programs were inefficient and needed to be replaced by a formal devaluation
was repeatedly stressed. On the other hand, official pronouncements also
promised an improved export performance, clearly basing this on the net
devaluation which had been built into the June 1966 package, as well as on
the improved availability of aid for raw material imports and on the theme
that even the replacement of the subsidies by a formal devaluation would,
in the longer run, give more stable incentives for exporl; promotion.
3. It is not equally clear whether the government also intended to usher
in import and industrial licensing policies that would have provided a more
efficient set of incentives for the pattern of import substitution. In the be-
ginning the "import liberalization" apparently was conceived to imply not
just additional availability of raw material imports (on AU licenses); there
are some indications that the principle of automatic protection by means of
the indigenous availability system was also expected to be steadily dislodged.
Industrial licensing policy, as we saw in Chapter 5, was also being amended
in favor of more extensive de-licensing of industries. Ii: seemed, therefore, as
if the June 1966 policy changes were intended, in themselves and in the over-
all context of ongoing changes in industrial licensing, also to (a) reduce the
reliance on QRs through improved export performance and (temporarily) in-
creased availability of aid, (b) reduce simultaneously the element of automatic
and indiscriminate protection that had resulted in a chaotic pattern of import
substitution, (c) increase the element of competition by permitting freer
domestic entry in the de-licensed industries and greater role for imports, and
finally to (d) improve export performance also by making investment and
production responses to export incentives more readil.y possible than under
the cumbersome licensing procedures.
Were They Achieved?
We can therefore judge the outcome in terms of these three sets of ob-
jectives. In these terms, the liberalization episode must be described as less
than successful, at best, and as bordering on failure when the credits and
debits are totaled up.
1. The replacement of the de facto by the de devaluation was
clearly accomplished in the very act of the June 6, 1966, policy announce-
ment. As we have noted, the import duties were reduced and export subsidies
were removed on that date. But, in the long haul, the intended reform of
the trade and payments regime was not achieved, resulting in a lapse into158 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
Phase II, as the cumbersome complex of multi-sided and selective export sub-
sidization was revived (as noted in Chapter 7). The rationalization of the
export subsidy situation was extremely short-lived indeed! It would appear
that, with the overvaluation of the exchange rate still continuing after June
1 966—the import premia still continuing to obtain on the overwhelming bulk
of imports, at sizable levels, and the exchange control mechanism, therefore,
still occupying its central role in the regime—the logic in favor of export sub-
sidization was indeed strong: in principle, to offset the discrimination against
exports in an overvalued system, export subsidization makes sense. On the
other hand, the indiscriminate, administrative selectivity and other ineffi-
ciencies of subsidization do not make sense; and these were indeed, as we saw
in Chapter 7, to reappear, implying that the government had more or less
failed in its objective of rationalizing the export subsidization schemes on a
continuing basis.
2. The objective of improved export performance was indeed achieved,
if one has suitably adjusted for exogenous factors such as the second agri-
cultural drought (as in Chapter 9). This (post-adjustment) improvement
was nonetheless not dramatic because the size of the net devaluation was
significantly lower than that of the gross devaluation.1 At the same time, the
revival of subsidization of the "new" exports clearly helped: our dummy-
variable analysis picks up an overall effect which includes the effect of these
subsidies as well. Thus we can conclude that the total policy package (in-
clusive of export subsidization) as of, and since, June 1966 did improve
export performance. However, we must stress again that this improved ex-
port performance was based, insofar as it reflected the impact of revived export
subsidization, on a set of subsidy policies that were conceived purely as
export-augmenting policies rather than as efficient export-augmenting policies.
Thus, the gain in export performance was, as before June 1966, bought at
the cost of inefficiency in export promotion.
3. The explicit surrender of the objective of a rationalized export sub-
sidy system was also to be matched by the frustration of similar objectives
in the fields of import and industrial policies.
(a) The improvement in export performance did help, ceteris paribus,
to ease the restrictiveness of the OR-regime. And the increased availability of
aid after June 1966 also initially helped in this direction. However, as we have
already shown, the utilization of this aid was hampered by the recipient's
and donors' dilatory administrative procedures and was then partly frustrated
by the onset of the industrial recession.2 In fact, the aid authorizations after
1966—67, whatever the reasons, were never to reach the level presumably
promised as an inducement for the June 1966 reforms, thus leading to the
widespread charge that the government had been tricked into these policy
changes with promises of accelerated aid flows that had failed to materialize—THE LIBERALIZATION EPISODE: EVALUATION AND LESSONS 159
an outcome of great significance in determining the political success, and
hence the repeatability, of such a liberalization package. Thanks mainly to the
recession, however, which was largely exogenous to the June 1966 policy
package, the demand for imports appears to have been effectively low enough
to lead to premia levels on imports that were somewhat lower than in the
period prior to devaluation.
This is apparently true for both El (traders') imports, as illustrated by
premia on selected items in Table 11—1, as well as for the more substantial
AU imports which went directly to the producers.3 This effective reduction
in. the restrictiveness of the OR-regime, however, followed in large part
from the recession which, according to our analysis, was a result of drought-
induced fiscal and monetary policies which must be construed as exogenous
to the 1966 package of trade and exchange rate policy changes.
And indeed, by 1967—68, as the industrial recession was giving way to
a more buoyant industrial economy, the premia on several AU imports had
already begun to reach higher levels. While it is not possible, in the nature of
the case, to develop systematic time series on these premia because of the
quasi-illegal aura surrounding the sale of imports or import licenses in the In-
dian context (as we saw earlier in Part II), we have been able to put together
from different sources premia estimates for certain items, underlining our as-
sertion that the premia on AU imports had begun reaching substantial levels
by 1967—68 and continued to be at high levels through 1970—71 (when our
study was being undertaken). Thus, copper, bronze, zinc, lead, nickel and
other metal products, several steel products (such as steel wire and sheets),
most chemicals, paper and paper products, glass and machinery (including
ball-bearings and precision tools) had import premia ranging between 70 to
100 percent from 1967—68 to
Thus, by 1967—68, the import liberalization did not quite match the
original intentions of the government. After the devaluLation and associated
measures were announced, they were followed on June 21, 1966, by a press
note on import policy which marked the major steps toward liberalization of
maintenance imports. A list of 59"priority"industries was soon set up, ex-
tending to about 80 percent of total organized-sector industrial production.
Liberal licensing for these industries, which included several exporting indus-
tries as well, was announced so that the units in these industries would be
able to meet their full requirements by merely going back to the DGTD and
seeking additional import licenses. In addition, the policy was to be liberalized
(in respect of IDA credits) in easing restrictions on the value of the license
that could be expended on specific imports, thereby ostensibly releasing the
firms from obligation to seek detailed specific permissions each time they
wished to change the composition of the imports they sought. Imports in the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of 1968—69, these relaxations had begun to be tightened; and by 1970—71,
the system was substantially back where it had begun, indicating a relapse
into Phase Il-type import controls.5
(b) Therefore, while the liberalization of maintenance imports did not
remain on a continuing basis beyond 1968—69, the extension of the liberaliza-
tion to imports that were in competition with domestic production was even
shorter-lived. Those who held the notion that the policy changes of June 1966
would also effectively dislodge the principle of indigenous availability and the
consequent automatic protection of domestic production were to be disabused
during 1966—67 itself. It quickly turned out that there was stiff opposition
from domestic producers to such import relaxation; there were active and suc-
cessful representations to the Ministers of Finance and Industry to halt such
imports and to restore the sheltered market. Apparently, it was easy to seduce
Ministers into such action because they had long been taught to believe that
any import substitution was good. The corollary that domestic production in
any activity should not be allowed to be replaced by "scarce" imports was
therefore equally difficult to purge from the policy-makers' thinking. Thus,
import liberalization came to mean merely that the imports of non-competing
goods, in the main, would be increased.
(c) The increase in industrial efficiency that was expected to result from
increased competition (de-licensing of industries eased domestic restrictions
on entry), was also to be frustrated. Given the continuing operation of im-
port licensing, the fact that a firm could establish new capacity in a de-licensed
industry merely meant that the detailed scrutiny and possibility of rejection
that characterized all licensing procedures now applied to requests for import
licenses. Access to imports, since it continued to be administratively con-
trolled rather than through the market, was then the point at which licensing
was effectively being implemented! Little of substance, in relation to effective
entry, was therefore to change in the system. Hence, increased efficiency from
greater competition was not a gain to be had, in practice, from the June 1966
and related policy measures.
(d) Finally, the expected improvement in the ability of exporters to
respond to enhanced export incentives, following on the liberalized licensing
structure, was stymied for similar reasons. While, as we have seen in Chap-
ter 9, the government undertook a number of measures intended to help
exporters get around the difficulties and obstacles that the licensing machinery
created for them in the first place, there is plenty of evidence from interviews
that, in matters such as product design changes and expansion of capacity,
the bureaucratic procedures and delays were continuing, contributory factors
in reducing the responsiveness of exports to improved prices.6 Thus gains on
this account, while probably positive, appear to have been relatively small.THE LIBERALIZATION EPISODE: EVALUATION AND LESSONS 163
On balance, therefore, the basic objectives of the policies which peaked
in the June 1966 set of measures do not appear to have been achieved to a
significant degree.
Public Perceptions.
Curiously enough, the public evaluation, including that among financial
commentators and not merely among the political and bureaucratic elite
groups, appears to have been dominated by quite the opposite criteria! The
"rationalization" of the trade and payments regime was hardly considered and
was implicitly either disregarded or not understood. On the other hand, the
success (or rather the failure) was judged essentially by reference to the pre-
sumed effect of the policy package on export performance and on the price
level. In addition, the political circumstances surrounding the policy announce-
ments were critical, and the policy of increasing aid flows on condition that
the policy changes be implemented seems to have created expectations that
were not to be fulfilled. Furthermore, some concern about the impact on the
terms of trade was expressed. Surprisingly, while economists would naturally
worry about the possibly deflationary (immediate) impact of an LDC-type
devaluation,7 public evaluation of the industrial recession that followed June
1966 does not seem to have attributed the recession to the liberalization poli-
cies. We take up each of these strands for more detailed comment now.
EXPORT PERFORMANCE
The public view of export performance, we must conclude, was deeply
affected by the fact that total earnings failed to rise and even fell marginally
in the two years after the devaluation. Two major aspects of the June 1966
package and subsequent developments were ignored: (1) the fact that the net
devaluation was significantly smaller than the gross devaluation, and (2) the
exogenous impact (largely from the drought) on the export performance of
traditional exports. We have noted already that the objective situation was dif-
ferent, and indeed more favorable, than the superficial view of the situation
would lead one to believe. But the superficial views did dominate the general
reaction.
PRICE LEVEL
Similarly, the post hoc ergo propter hoc illogic applied to the phenome-
non of rising prices that dominated public consciousness in the year following
the devaluation. As we have noted in Chapter 8, the objective situation again
was very different, with the effect of the exogenous drought responsible for
the major price rise in the system.164 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
POLITICAL REACTION
The political response to the liberalization package was, as we have seen
in Chapter 10, extremely critical. The essential weakness of the package was
the fact that it was widely considered, and with much justification, to have
been forced upon India by Western aid donors,
In particular, since the Soviet Union, which is also a major aid donor
of India, was not associated with this change of policies in June 1966, the
charge has continued to stick in the popular mind that devaluation is an
"imperialist," "neo-colonial" policy. The charge has also been made in the
left-wing press, from time to time, against the civil servants and Ministers
who had supported the devaluation decision, that they are the saboteurs of
"socialism."8 These charges were revived in December 1971 when the realign-
ment of exchange rates around the world forced India to take a position on her
own exchange rate. The Indian decision was a compromise solution: the rupee
was partially devalued so that its parity vis-à-vis the dollar actually went up.
The left-wing press took the opportunity to attack those who, though over-
ruled, had sensibly proposed that India should at least devalue to the same
extent as the dollar.9
The 1971 decision on the rupee also underlined the fact that the senior
Ministers were unwilling to be caught supporting any devaluation of the rupee..
The majority of them, including the Minister of Foreign Trade, felt that the
devaluation was a politically unpopular policy, that it might have caused the
Congress party its reverses in the 1967 elections, and that it was, in any case,
politically risky to be vulnerable to left-wing charges of being "soft on the
Americans" at a time when American hostility toward India in the Indo-
Pakistan War had made any sympathy for policies popularly associated with
the United States a serious liability.10
In fact, even the partial degree of parity change that was achieved was
a triumph of skill and ingenuity on the part of the top-level advisers. By claim-
ing that India should link itself with sterling, and by taking advantage of the
fact that the United Kingdom's decision was to reduce its revaluation subse-
quent to the dollar devaluation, while leaving the sterling appreciated vis-à-vis
the dollar, they managed to reduce the parity vis-à-vis the dollar by the same
amount as the reduction in the percentage revaluation of the sterling. Thus,
in effect, the rupee was devalued vis-à-vis the old dollar; but, given the larger
devaluation of the dollar itself, the rupee parity with the dollar actually moved
up from Rs.7.50 to Rs.7.28 per U.S. dollar.'1
The political failure of the 1966 liberalization package can thus be re-
garded as overwhelming: not merely did the government face a political storm
over it but the political capacity to repeat such a package was damaged.'2THE LIBERALIZATION EPISODE: EVALUATION AND LESSONS 165
AID-INFLOW AND POLITICS
One interesting aspect of the decision by the donor countries virtually to
impose liberalization on the Indian government by making continuation of
large-scale aid virtually conditional on this and other changes in policies was
that the policies were often to be judged in terms of how much aid actually
did come in, subsequent to the devaluation. This was to work politically
against the June 1966 reforms for the simple reason that, along with the
general decline in aid flows during this period, the Indian aid receipts were
to decline steadily.13
This was to lead to widespread criticism of the government by the influ-
ential press and politicians on the left, including the charge within the ruling
Congress party that those politicians and economists who had accepted the
imposition of these "market-oriented" and laissez-faire-type policies from
the Western powers, and had hoped to be rewarded by large inflows of aid,
had found that this "bribe" had not materialized and that the country had
been unwittingly duped with the aid of these Indians.
It should be emphasized that (i) substantial aid did materialize after the
devaluation and (ii) these Indian economists and politicians genuinely be-
lieved, and some of them had publicly argued to that effect even prior to the
aid suspension and foreign pressures thereafter, that these policy changes
were long overdue. These facts, however, are irrelevant to the fact that the
unwise pressure on India in the general direction of measures such as those in
the liberalization package had made the charges we have just described cred-
ible to vast numbers of people, and made them believe that here was one
more powerful reason why the "devaluation had failed."
TERMS OF TRADE
Among the less frequent indications of success, though one not used out-
side financial circles, was the effect of devaluation on the terms of trade. De-
valuation is traditionally regarded as a dangerous policy because it may lead
to an adverse impact on the terms of trade. In a real sense, this is a fear based
on confusion. If there is no reason, such as residual monopoly power in trade,
to use tariffs (or tariff equivalents such as an overvalued exchange rate), then
devaluation is indeed the optimal policy for regulating external accounts. And,
if there is monopoly power in trade which is not yet exercised, then the opti-
mum tariff argument itself requires that tariffs be used to improve the terms of
trade and to restrict trade, in the first place, and then devaluation be used
beyond that for regulating the external accounts. Concern with what happens
to the terms of trade, as such, is therefore quite misplaced.
Since, however, in some assessments of the devaluation, the effect on
the terms of trade was regarded as important, we may examine the behavior166 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
of the Indian terms of trade subsequent to the June 1966 devaluation. Note,
of course, that the actual behavior of the terms of trade would reflect exog-
enous movements in the prices of traded goods abroad; also, insofar as the
composition of exports and imports is likely to shift in response to a devalua-
tion (e.g., new exports are likely to become more competitive and therefore
to materialize), the movement in the terms of trade (as customarily measured)
is not unambiguously interpretable.
The terms of trade index (defined as the unit export value index divided
by the unit import value index) during 1966—67, taking only the ten months
following the devaluation into account, actually improved from 109 in
1965—66 to 113; it rose yet further to 124 during 1967—68 (Table 11—2).
Indeed, the terms of trade for 1963—64 to 1965—66 averaged 108 whereas
for 1966—67 to 1969—70 the average improved to 119. Thus, by this fal-
lacious but nonetheless influential index of failure, the devaluation in 1966
was not a failure; instead of worsening, the terms of trade actually improved.
THE RECESSION
It is interesting that there islittle of the June 1966 policy
changes being blamed for the industrial recession. Objectively speaking, as
we have shown in the fiscal and monetary policies which were, at
TABLE 11-2
Terms of Trade, 1960—61 to 1969—70
(base: 1958100)
Exports Imports .
Termsof Volume Unit Value Volume Unit Value
Index Index Index Index Tradea
1960—61 100 110 128 96 115
1961—62 105 109 121 98 111
1962—63 112 106 131 94 113
1963—64 126 105 135 97 108
1964-65 132 107 146 99 108
1965—66 124 113 154 104 109
1966_67b 119 169 149 150 113
1967—68 122 169 166 136 124
1968—69 142 166 151 141 118
1969—70 143 171 128 140 122
SOURCE: Government of India, Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and
Statistics,New Delhi.
a. Export unit value index dividedby import unit value index.
b.Covers only the 10 months following devaluation, June through April.THE LIBERALIZATION EPISODE: EVALUATION AND LESSONS 167
'east in large part, responsible for the recession were exogenous to the devalu-
ation decision and were largely the result of the fear that otherwise the drought-
induced increase in the price level would be accentuated. In fact, the influence
of the June 1966 policy package (plus the revived export subsidies) is likely
to have been mildly expansionary in having made exportation more profitable
than earlier for the non-traditional exports. Thus, in this instance, the ob-
jective reality (of, at best, a mildly favorable impact on economic activity)
was fairly close to the subjective evaluation (which did not link up the policy
package with the recession, in any case).
LESSONS
What principal lessons can we draw from this analysis?
1. For the donor countries, it seems clear that the dominant lesson is not
to force changes in policy, particularly ones with an ideological slant in the
public view, by using withdrawal of aid as the lever. This may work with
countries that do not have a free press and a democratic framework; it can
be nothing short of disastrous in other contexts. Above all,it can ruin the
political credibility of the local groups who support these policies and thereby
compromise their ability to press for a repeated application of such measures
in the future.
2. For the liberalizing country itself, the implication equally is that the
appearance (and, even more so, the reality) of surrencler to "aid blackmail"
would compromise the political success, and hence the repeatability, of a lib-
eralization package.
3. On the timing of devaluation-cum-liberalization, it is clearly important,
in view of the tendency to judge major policy changes in terms of post hoc
ergo pro pter hoc illogic, that LDCs (which typically have their price level
and exports geared to their agricultural situation) should choose a time just
after a good harvest.
4. It is also clearly important not to delay the adoption of a liberalization
package to a point where a large de facto devaluation has to be replaced by
a still larger parity change. The distinction between gross and net devaluations
is too subtle to be grasped except by a few sophisticated economists and it
seems not to arouse excessive expectations about improvements in export
performance when the devaluation looks large. At the same time, the replace-
Inent of the ad hoc and selective export subsidization (which must invariably
flourish under a large de facto devaluation) becomes both difficult and liable
to contradict the assessed success of any net devaluation insofar as some ex-
ports, which are uneconomical but were promoted under indiscriminate export
subsidization, are eliminated by the shift to a de jure devaluation.168 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
5. The impossibility of dislodging the principle of indigenous availability
and the consequent survival of sheltered markets underline the plausible con-
clusion that it is not easy to implement a "true" liberalization designed to
improve the competitiveness and efficiency of domestic import substitution
when exchange control over a long period has corrupted domestic industry,
bureaucrats and politicians into considering any production that competes
with imports as necessarily desirable and therefore automatically superior to
rival imports. It does suggest, however, that the more feasible, and less dis-
ruptive, approach to the dismantling of such automatic protection would be
to convert the implicit into explicit tariffs and then to set a gradualistic time
schedule for bringing them to uniformity around a modest rate.
6. The resumption of the suspended aid flow was clearly helpful; but it
tells us nothing about the issue of augmenting foreign credits as part of a lib-
eralization package. There is, however, one point of substance that needs to
be made here. As we saw, it took time for the resumed aid flow to actually
reach importers: the delays were caused at both recipient and donor ends.
These delays, which could have been reduced under better administrative
arrangements, were to be followed by the recession which was largely brought
on by the decelerating investments and outlays by the government which
dreaded the possibility that otherwise the drought-induced price rises would
be accentuated further. It is clear that if aid, which was largely available for
"maintenance" imports (i.e., imports of raw materials and spares), had been
partly available for increased imports of (the right) food grains, aid utilization
would have been more rapid in tow and for maintenance, as the need for a
deflationary policy would have been eliminated. The net effect thus should
have been greater utilization of aid, greater production and investment levels
in industry, and (at worst) only a moderate, adverse impact on non-traditional
exports (because the reduced depression in domestic demand would have
affected, ceteris pan bus, the improved performance of the non-traditional
industries, as indicated by our analysis in Chapter 9). The net result would
have been, therefore, favorable, particularly if we take into account the fact
that higher levels of activity would have permitted the import liberalization to
be perhaps more genuine—in a recession, it is doubly difficult to attack the
principle of indigenous availability. The lessons, therefore, are that the red
tape in aid-disbursement and aid-tying-by-commodity-specification are both
factors that can critically affect the performance of a liberalization package;
and concentration merely on the total level of aid authorization or foreign
credits can be counter-productive.
7. Finally, we may well ask whether the Indian policy package could
have been improved, in any fundamental regard, so as to yield better results.
This is a somewhat difficult question to answer as our analysis has indicated
that there were several different factors interacting on the situation and theTHE LIBERALIZATION EPISODE: EVALUATION AND LESSONS 169
outcome, some exogenous and beyond control and others within the set of
available policy instruments. We must therefore work at several levels of
approximation. If we assume that the Aid Consortium 'would necessarily have
made aid flow conditional on the Indian government's undertaking a devalua-
tion, and that the composition of the aid flow was also to be suboptimal (in
the sense we have already discussed in this chapter), then the only meaningful
questions relate to whether (1) the government could have done better by
changing the policy package (e.g., choosing a different degree of devaluation)
and by choosing also a different set of fiscal and monetary policies, and
(2) the government could have done better by not succumbing to the pressure
for devaluation. Taking the latter question first,it seems that the economic
situation had deteriorated in the aftermath of the War of 1965
and the interruptions in aid had led to shortages of imports that were hurting
the economy badly. It seems, therefore, as if the effectiveness of aid diplomacy
in forcing the government to devalue was very great; and it does not seem
to us that, unless the government could reasonably count on resumption of
significant aid, there was any real choice in the matter at that time. If we
then suppose that the devaluation had to be undertaken anyway, was it the
right amount? It is possible, in retrospect, to argue that it was either too much
or too little. If we assume, as we must, that the drought was to follow the
devaluation, it may have been quite sensible perhaps to make the devaluation,
on a netbasis,as low as possible and to claim unambiguously that the objec-
tive of the devaluation was wholly to replace the existing tariffs and export
subsidies, which had been levied in lieu of the devaluation, and that short-
term export performance improvement was therefore not an objective of the
exercise at all. This might have eased the situation politically, however slightly.
On the other hand, we might argue that the decision was going to be unpopular
anyway, and that therefore the objective should have been to devalue as much
as possible this time itself as it would not be possible to use the instrument
again in the near future! In fact, since our analysis also has indicated that
the devaluation (net) did help promote exports, itis arguable that an in-
creased degree of (net) devaluation would have led to more exports and also
to greater economic activity. Against this, however, we must balance the fact
that, in an inflationary situation resulting from the drought, a greater degree
of devaluation would have led to price changes that might well have been
politically unsettling at a difficult time. Our own conclusion is that, given the
external constraint of the demand for a devaluation by the aid donors as a pre-
condition for the resumption of large-scale aid and in view of the severe drought
to follow later, the government was probably wise in having acted in a reason-
ably cautious fashion by keeping the net devaluation wit:hin reasonable bounds.
We probably need to stress again, however, that the optimal course of action,
in light of later developments, would have been rather for the Aid Consortium170 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
merely to press for a substantial unification of the tariffs and subsidies (this
was beginning to happen, as we noted in Chapter 5) and strongly urge that
at a reasonable future point (after the new harvest had been reliably forecast
as good) the de facto devaluation be replaced by a de juTe change of parity,
and resume the aid flow. This would have taken the sting out of the charges
of political pressure for a change in the rate of the Indian rupee and made the
transition to a better and more efficient foreign exchange regime more attrac-
tive to the policy-makers and the politicians and therefore also feasible. On
the other hand, given the strong dissatisfaction that the Western aid donors
felt with India's economic policies and performance, it would have been ask-
ing too much to expect them to forgo the opportunity provided by the suspen-
sion of aid during the Indo-Pakistan hostilities of October 1965 to make the
resumption of large-scale aid conditional on prompt changes in Indian eco-
nomic policy.
RELAPSE INTO PHASE II
In conclusion, we may note that the ultimate outcome of the- attempted lib-
eralization in 1966, which inaugurated Phase III, was a lelapse into Phase II.
Differential export subsidies emerged at significant levels; the QR-regime
continued with high premia on several items; the principle of automatic pro-
tection was not abandoned; and industrial licensing continued in substance.
The emergence from the recession around 1969-'70 appears to have com-
bined with severely declining aid levels to produce a "structural deficit" that
increased import premia and the consequent stringency of QRs, a phenome-
non which was to be accentuated as the economy recovered to more "normal"
levels of activity in the industrial sector.
The hope that India would have moved into a liberal regime with ju-
dicious use of exchange rate flexibility (either de facto or de fure), and mod-
erate tariffs to grant protection to industry, thereby achieving greater economic
efficiency and growth, appears to have been belied although the situation in
1970—71 was somewhat better in this regard than in 1965—66.
The events on the Indian subcontinent, beginning with the crackdown by
Pakistan's army in East Pakistan on March 25,1971,the eventual influx of
over ten million refugees into India's troubled Eastern state of Bengal, the
staggering burden of this refugee. relief and its economic and political conse-
quences, the resulting war between Pakistan and India culminating in the
creation of Bangladesh, have made it impossible for the economy to return
to anything like a "normal" situation, or for the economist to analyze the
recent behavior of the economy in a plausible manner.
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ance of U.S. aid since the dramatic political events on the Ihdian subcontinent
during 1971, the importance of an improved and efficient production and
export performance—contingent on a successful transition to Phase 111—has
become even more manifest. Whether this will be understood, and whether
the tools of exchange rate policy and a more efficient and less wasteful form
of domestic protection will be deployed in the coming years, remains to
be seen.
NOTES
1. The effect on some of the major, "new" exports was, in fact, almost negligible
and even negative for some sectors, as Table 6—3inChapter 6 has shown. Thus, the
revival of the export subsidies on these items was critical to their improved export
performance.
2. The latter argument is compatible with the existence of finite, and even sizable,
import premia in general because the QR-licensing regime continued to imply non-
transferability of licenses as well as delays in licensing renewals.
3. In interpreting Table 11—1, however, we must allow for the fact that the period
immediately preceding the devaluation in June 1966 was "abnormal" because of the
suspension of U.S. aid, and several import premia were at exceptionally high levels.
4. For lack of space, we have not been able to reproduce here the import premia.
However, they are available from Dr. V. R. Panchamukhi at Bombay University, on
request.
5. Practically none of the cosmetics was to change; but effectively the restrictions
were to be de facto back in operation, implying the relapse into Phase II.
6. Frankena, "Export." His chapter on design problems offers a useful discussion of
such difficulties in the engineering industry during the post-1966 period.
7. See J. Bhagwati, "The Case for Devaluation," Economic Weekly, August 1962,
pp. 1263—1266; and Richard Cooper, "Currency Devaluation in Developing Countries"
(Paper No. 166, Economic Growth Center, Yale University).
8. The Prime Minister herself is exempted from this charge on the convenient
assumption that she was wrongly advised; this represents nothing more than coming to
terms with the reality of her lately acquired immense hold on Indian politics and amnesia
regarding earlier attacks on her bona tides as well in the wake of the devaluation.
9. Thus, Link (a popular, left-wing weekly) carried the following story on De-
cember 8, 1971: "Fortunately, the suggestion that the rupee should also be revalued with
the devaluation of the dollar was rejected by the Union Cabinet though some senior
bureaucrats, including chief economic advisor I. G. Patel, who pleaded for it were
reportedly supported by Planning Minister Subramaniam. A different viewpointis
understood to have been put forth by a section of the Finance Ministry's experts, in.
cluding economic adviser Ashok Mitra. It must be said to the Finance Minister's credit
that when he was called upon to give his personal opinion he opted against devaluation
of the rupee. A repetition of 1965 [1966, Sic] was thus averted...
10.Itisthereforereally remarkable that the Minister for Planning, Mr. C.
Subramaniam, who had been a member of the three-Minister group which advised the
Prime Minister in 1966 on the devaluation, had reportedly the political courage to
propose that the rupee rate be adjusted fully to maintain parity with the dollar.172 LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
11. If India had not changed its parity, the new rate would have been Rs.6.90 per
U.S. dollar. This ingenious method of partially following the dollar devaluation could be
put across and implemented only because few if any of the anti-devaluation Ministers
could have followed the complex nature of the changes in parity rates at the time. The
Prime Minister is reported to have remarked that she was out of her depth, with some
claiming that the rupee had been revalued and others that it had been devalued!
12. We may note that in "Currency Devaluation" Cooper's criterion of political
failure—whether the finance minister or the government falls shortly after a devaluation
—is not helpful (as he himself admits). Though in this instance S. Chadhuri, the Finance
Minister, did fall, he was a marginal minister anyway. The Planning Minister, Asoka
Mehta, was eventually eased out, but for a whole complex of reasons. The Food
Minister, C. Subramaniarn, has survived, has continued to enjoy the prime minister's
confidence and even advocates further devaluation. And ironically, the Prime Ministei
herself found that by sharpening her differences with the senior Congress bosses who had
criticized her openly for her decision to devalue, she helped to bring on a struggle from
which she has emerged as the undisputed leader of her party and country. In retrospect,
not only did Mrs. Gandhi recover extremely well from this controversy, but she may well
owe her political triumph to it.
13. See J. Bhagwati, Amount and Sharing of Aid (Washington D.C.: Overseas
Development Council, 1970).